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Abstract
Earlier research has shown that the tragedy of the commons may be resolved by
Folk theorems for dynamic games. In this article we graft on a standard natural-
resource exploitation game the possibility to appropriate the resource through violent
means. Because conflict emerges endogenously as resources get depleted, the threat
supporting the cooperative outcome is no longer subgame perfect, and thus credible.
The unique equilibrium is such that players exploit non-cooperatively the resource
when it is abundant and they revert to conflict when it becomes scarce. The players’
utility is shown to be lower even if conflict wastes no resources.
Keywords: Tragedy of the Commons, Conflict, Dynamic Game
JEL Classification: C73, D74, Q2
1 Introduction
A vast body of literature has studied the problem of the management of common pool
resources. This literature tends to assume away notions such as violent appropriation
and conflict. Yet the historical example of Easter Island’s collapse demonstrates the
close connections between the management of the commons and violence. When the
first European expedition reached Easter Island in 1722, its inhabitants were living in
a heavily depleted environment. According to Jared Diamond (2005) the society was
organized in hierarchical clans that peacefully competed with each other for power
supremacy by erecting stone statues. For this purpose, the island’s tallest trees were
cut down, as a result of which a rapid deforestation occurred.1 The exhaustion of
this vital natural resource used to construct fishing canoes spurred an acceleration
of the island’s inland fauna exploitation, eventually creating food scarcities so severe
that cannibalism emerged. In 1680, as the situation must have reached dramatic
levels of deprivation of all kinds, and with the elites proving unable to deliver their
promises to their people, a sort of military coup occurred, followed by a prolonged
period of wars.
The Easter Islanders are but one example of the inability of a group of individuals
to manage the common pool resources in an efficient way, therefore being the victims
of the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). Yet, such failure to cooperate in the
resource exploitation may seem at odds with existing theories on the subject. The
essence of the problem at stake is that for the economically efficient management
1A controversy on the real causes of the Island’s deforestation is still open among scientists
(Hunt and Lipo 2011).
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rule to emerge spontaneously it is necessary that property rights over the resource be
well defined and enforced (Coase 1960, Hardin 1968). The required institutions are,
however, absent in many settings because of a lack of local (sub-national) or global
(international) governance. Ostrom (1990) and Baland and Platteau (1996) narrate
how local communities may succeed in overcoming the tragedy of the commons. Yet,
the mechanisms identified by these authors necessitate a strong form of social capital
that is absent in many CPR contexts. Extending Folk theorems for repeated games
to dynamic games, economists then proposed a more general solution to the CPR
management inefficiency. Cooperation on the efficient exploitation of a depletable
resource may be achieved by the threat of reverting to non-cooperation in case of non-
compliance to the agreed behavior (Cave 1987, Dutta 1995, Sorger 2005, Dutta and
Radner 2009).2 Why should therefore the efficient outcome fail to be implemented in
dynamic settings? Consistently with the Easter Island example, the theory developed
in this article identifies the anticipation of conflict as the causal element for the
breakdown of cooperation.
In this article we introduce the possibility of violently appropriating the stock of
resources in a dynamic game of CPR exploitation. The main finding of the article is
that when resources are dynamically depleted along the cooperative extraction path,
conflict will occur with certainty when resources are sufficiently depleted. When
the resource becomes scarce, should the players decide to fight over the remaining
stock of resources, they will be acquiring few armaments. Consequently, conflicts
would then be of low intensity, which would also mean that they would be less
2For an early work on the strategic exploitation of a CPR in a dynamic setting, see Levhari and
Mirman (1980).
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destructive. As a consequence, in the presence of depleted stocks of resources, players
may violently appropriate at a low cost part of the goods which they will then
manage privately. Given that the first best solution fails to be stable, no alternative
path of play to the conflict-reversion strategy can be an equilibrium either. As
a consequence, the punishment threat for not respecting a cooperative agreement
stops being credible (i.e. subgame perfect), thus implying that cooperation itself
breaks down. Interestingly, even if conflict intensity is extremely low at equilibrium,
the resulting breakdown of cooperation implies that the players’ utility will always be
lower as compared to a conflict-free setting. This follows from the over-exploitation
of the resource in the periods where the stock is sufficiently abundant for players not
to fight over its control.
This article contributes to the expanding field of conflict theory. Whereas the
initial writings mainly focused on static properties of conflict models, the dynamic
dimension has received increased attention lately. Some interesting issues that have
been explored are the timing of conflict when the players’ strength evolves either
exogenously (Bester and Konrad 2004), or endogenously yet in a deterministic way
(Powell 2012), deterrence and preventive motives for conflict (Jackson and Morelli
2009, Chassang and Padro´ i Miquel 2009), as well as dynamic incentives to pursue
fighting over time (Leventoglu and Slantchev 2007). A common dynamic incentive in
conflict settings is to attempt modifying the sharing of the contested pie in the short
run through violent means in order to enhance one’s continuation value, although
the more valuable the prize, the more intense and thus costly will the conflict be
(McBride and Skaperdas 2007, Esteban et al. 2011).
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Garfinkel (1990) and Yared (2010) both investigate the scope for reaching peaceful
agreements in repeated games of resource exploitation and conflict. Garfinkel (1990)
was the first to study Folk theorems for conflict models and established that in a
repeated prisoner-dilemma type of setting, peace can be supported as an equilibrium
for sufficiently patient players. More recently, Yared (2010) extended the analysis to
a context involving information imperfections and considered the harshest existing
subgame perfect punishments. In Yared’s model, because of informational imper-
fections, temporary punishments under the form of non-permanent wars may occur
along the equilibrium path. Common to these two articles is the repeated nature of
the game, which implies that the resource at stake is a constant flow of wealth. Such
models are well suited therefore to formalize potential conflicts over the control of
economic sectors and territories. In our setting, the resource is instead conceptual-
ized as a stock that regenerates at some non-negative rate, thus implying that our
model captures better the dynamics of finite resources, whether they regenerate or
not.
Acemoglu, Golosov, Tsyvinski, and Yared (AGTY, 2012) is perhaps the closest
contribution to ours as they consider a dynamic game of trade and conflict over an
exhaustible resource whose value is a function of its scarcity. In exploring the condi-
tions favoring the peaceful dynamic trade as opposed to an invasion by a resourceless
player, AGTY show that if the depletable resource, which is located in one country,
is exploited competitively, individual firms fail to internalize the negative externality
of their individual extraction on the increased likelihood of foreign intervention. The
high prices that this exploitation generates in the future, boosts the future incen-
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tives for conflict, thus feeding back in the firms’ short run incentives to exploit the
resource, which eventually triggers immediate conflict. Whereas both our models are
dynamic and feature an exhaustible resource, they differ along several dimensions.
A first dimension along which these two articles differ is that whereas in AGTY
the players are either resource users able to wield power if needed to appropriate the
resources, or else resource exploiters, in the present work players are both exploiters
and consumers of the resource. This modeling assumption comes at a cost given
that, to keep the model tractable, in this article, unlike in AGTY, the players are
assumed to be symmetric. Second, we impose log-utility functions that in AGTY
would translate in war-incentives not depending on the amount of resources. Instead,
in our framework arming is not a separable cost, hence implying that conflict gen-
erates a double inefficiency: it destroys part of the stock of resources, and it diverts
otherwise productive resources to fighting activities, which further contributes to the
depletion of the stock. Hence, whereas in AGTY the cost of conflict and its outcome
are both exogenous (assailant wins with unit probability), we instead enable both
sides to decide their armament levels, hence also making the winning probabilities
endogenous. These modeling differences underlie the differences in the mechanics
conducive to conflict in AGTY and in this article. In AGTY conflict results from
the market price of resources being an increasing price of their scarcity, whereas the
cost of violently appropriating the resources through war remains constant. In our
framework instead, as resources become scarce, the investments in armaments de-
crease as well, thus reducing the burden of the conflict and equally making it less
destructive. Lastly, we extend the analysis to the concept of subgame perfection
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instead of focusing on the subset of Markov perfect equilibria.
In the next section we develop a standard benchmark model of dynamic resource
exploitation and we identify sufficient conditions for the efficient solution to be sus-
tained as an equilibrium. In Section 3 we introduce the possibility of reverting to
violence in this same game. Lastly, Section 4 concludes.
2 The model: peaceful world
We consider an infinite time horizon game of a renewable resource exploitation.
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0, 1, . . . ,∞. Two players labeled 1 and 2
simultaneously decide at each time period the amount of resources to exploit from
a common pool of renewable resources. In time zero the world is endowed with a
stock of r0 resources that grows at a linear rate γ.
3 Players costlessly invest effort in
resource-use, so that player i’s appropriation effort of renewable resources in time t
is denoted by ei,t, with ei,t ∈ [0, e¯], e¯ > r0. Player i’s associated consumption is given
by xi,t such that:
xi,t =

ei,t if e1,t + e2,t ≤ rt
ei,t
e1,t+e2,t
rt otherwise
(1)
The resources available in period t, rt, equal:
rt = (1 + γ)(rt−1 − x1,t−1 − x2,t−1) (2)
3The growth rate of the resources could equally be capturing the (constant) growth of produc-
tivity resulting from technological advances.
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The instantaneous utility of any player i in time t is given by:
ui,t = ln(xi,t)
And the discounted life-time utility of player i in time period 0 equals:
Ui,0 =
∞∑
t=0
δt ln(xit) (3)
Where δ stands for the discount rate.
We define a strategy for player i as ei = {ei,t}∞t=0.
The efficient solution
The efficient solution of this resource exploitation game is given by the solution
to the central planner’s following problem:
max
e1,e2
∑
i=1,2
∞∑
t=0
δt ln(xi,t) (4)
s.t. (1) and (2)
We denote by V c(rt) the value function of this problem given the resource stock rt,
meaning that the indirect aggregate utility can be expressed as a Bellman equation:
V c(rt) = arg max
e1,t,e2,t
[∑
i=1,2
ln (xi,t) + δV
c (rt+1)
]
(5)
Next, given the assumed regeneration rule, the above expression can be written
as:
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V c(rt) = arg max
e1,t,e2,t
[∑
i=1,2
ln (xi,t) + δV
c ((1 + γ) (rt − x1,t − x2,t))
]
(6)
Differentiating (6) with respect to the two decision variables, e1,t and e2,t, and
making use of (1) we obtain the following system of equations:

∂V c(rt)
∂e1,t
= 1
xc1(rt)
− δ(1 + γ)∑i=1,2 V ci ′ ((1 + γ) (rt − xc1 (rt)− xc2 (rt))) = 0
∂V c(rt)
∂e2,t
= 1
xc2(rt)
− δ(1 + γ)∑i=1,2 V ci ′ ((1 + γ) (rt − xc1 (rt)− xc2 (rt))) = 0 (7)
Where these equations hold because the constraint e1,t + e2,t ≤ rt will never be
binding, as limrt→0 V
c
i
′
= +∞.
From (7) we deduce that xc1(rt) = x
c
2(rt) = x
c(rt). To derive the efficient equi-
librium, we inquire whether xc(rt) may be a linear function of its argument so that
xc(rt) = λ
crt. This assumption implies that the stock of resources in time period t+1
can be expressed as rt+1 = (1 + γ) (1− 2λc) rt. Replacing in equation (4), together
with using the regeneration rule gives us:
V c(rt) = 2
[
ln (λcrt) + δ ln (λ
c(1 + γ)(1− 2λc)rt) + δ2 ln
(
λc(1 + γ)2(1− 2λc)2rt
)
+ . . .
]
(8)
Rearranging the terms of (8) gives us:
V c(rt) =
2 ln (λcrt)
1− δ + 2
∞∑
τ=0
δτ ln ((1 + γ)τ (1− 2λc)τ ) (9)
Thus implying that V c
′
(rt) =
2
(1−δ)rt . Substituting in (7) for V
c′(.) yields:
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1λcrt
− 2δ(1 + γ)
(1− δ)(1 + γ)(1− 2λc)rt ⇒ λ
c =
1− δ
2
This last expression stands for the share of available resources consumed by each
player under the efficient solution. The proportion of the stock of resources which
is preserved from one period to another therefore equals (1 + γ)δ.4 The optimal
consumption for any individual i is therefore given by:
xct =
(1− δ)rt
2
(10)
Hence implying that any player’s life time utility in time t can be written as:
V ci,t =
1
1− δ
[
ln
(
(1− δ)rt
2
)
+
δ
1− δ ln (δ(1 + γ))
]
(11)
Expression (11) gives us the life time utility of players in what we term the
“cooperative scenario”.
For this first-best solution to be a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), it is nec-
essary that no profitable deviation exists for either player. The instantaneous utility
players obtain by deviating from the efficient solution can straightforwardly be shown
to be higher than the instantaneous utility of cooperating. Hence, for the first-best
solution to be a SPE, it needs to be sustained by some form of decentralized dynamic
punishment. Any such threat ought to be subgame perfect itself, however. In what
follows we consider the harshest subgame perfect punishments.
4Notice that the resource is dynamically depleted if (1 + γ)δ < 1 ⇔ γ < 1−δδ . For the problem
to be salient, in the remainder of the article we assume that this condition is satisfied.
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Harshest punishment
We denote by H the set of strategies generating the harshest punishments of this
game. At time τ any strategies satisfying the following conditions belong to H.
ei,τ ≥ rτ , ei,τ+t ∈ [0, e¯] ∀t > 0,∀i ∈ {1, 2}
As there exists no profitable unilateral deviation from such strategy profiles, they
describe a SPE where the players’ associated utility is infinitely negative. From this
stems the following result:
Proposition 1. The first-best solution to the resource exploitation game is always
supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the following punishment: if (e1,t, e2,t) 6= (ec1t, ec2,t) for some t, then
et+1 ∈ H. Given that Vi,t reported in equation (11) is finite, deviating and obtaining
infinitely negative utility can never be profitable.
Because of the logarithmic specification we have chosen, the harshest punishments
consist in fully depleting the resource. Given that the players’ utility would then
become infinitely negative, any path of play generating some non-infinitely negative
payoff to both players may be sustained as a SPE. By extension therefore, the efficient
solution is equally supported as a an equilibrium. The full-depletion SPE supporting
the efficient solution do not survive stronger equilibrium refinements (as the extensive
form trembling hand perfect equilibrium). It can be shown, however, that there exist
milder punishments sustaining the efficient solutions for some 1 > δ > δ¯ > 0. As
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our theory will be shown to be true for any subgame perfect equilibrium, we do not
further explore these punishments.
3 The model: violent world
We now introduce in the game the possibility for players to revert to violence to
establish private property rights over the common pool resource.
The players begin by unilaterally deciding whether or not to initiate a contest
over the establishment of property rights on the common pool resource. Conflict
ensues if either or both players opt for conflict. In case of indifference, we assume
that players refrain from initiating conflict. In a second stage, players simultaneously
decide the amount of effort to devote to resource extraction to be used for building
weapons (eˆ1,t, eˆ2,t). Player i’s associated amount of weapons acquired in t is given
by gi,t such that:
gi,t =

eˆi,t if eˆ1,t + eˆ2,t ≤ rt
eˆi,t
eˆ1,t+eˆ2,t
rt otherwise
(12)
If conflict occurs in time t, a share ϕ(g1,t, g2,t) of the remaining stock of resources
is destroyed, and player i eventually retains control over a share p(gi,t, gj,t;α) =
gi,t+α/2
gi,t+gj,t+α
of the remaining stock of resources. The parameter α gauges the difficulty
of modifying that sharing when entering into an armed confrontation. We make the
following assumptions on the function ϕ(gi,t, gj,t):
ϕgi , ϕgj ≥ 0 if ϕ(gi, gj) < 1 , ϕgi , ϕgj = 0 otherwise ; ϕgi(0, 0) = ϕgj(0, 0) = 0
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ϕgigi , ϕgjgj , ϕgigj ≥ 0
We are therefore assuming that war is increasingly destructive for higher (indi-
vidual or aggregate) levels of the strength of the contestants involved in the conflict.5
Lastly, in stage 3, players decide the extraction efforts e1,t and e2,t for producing
consumables given that the pool is either commonly owned if no conflict took place
in period t or before, or else it is partitioned into private properties.
If conflict is decided in time period τ , player 1’s utility equals:
Uw1,τ =
ln
(
(1− δ)p(g1,τ , g2,τ ;α)(1− ϕ(g1,τ , g2,τ ))
(
rτ −
∑
i={1,2} gi,τ
))
1− δ +
δ ln ((1 + γ)δ)
(1− δ)2 (13)
After conflict occurred period τ player i becomes the sole manager of a share
p(g1,τ , g2,τ ;α)(1 − ϕ(g1,τ , g2,τ )) of the stock of resources rτ , out of which g1,τ + g2,τ
have been extracted for building weapons. As the players will afterwards manage
the resource efficiently, it is easy to show using the previous section’s techniques that
the optimal extraction rates over their private properties will then be (1− δ).
The timing of the resource extraction game in a violent world at each point in
time is the following:
1. Players simultaneously decide whether to initiate conflict
2. Players simultaneously decide the amount of consumables to dedicate to weapon-
building (g1,t, g2,t)
5These assumptions are sufficient for deriving the results in this article. The (weak) convexity
of ϕ(., .) guarantees the monotonicity of the players’ optimal weapons as a function of the stock of
resources. Sufficiently concave functions would lead to non-monotonic relationships.
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3. Players simultaneously decide their extraction efforts (e1,t, e2,t) for consumption
purposes (x1,t, x2,t)
Optimization in a violent world
Optimizing (13) for player 1 with respect to g1,τ subject to (12), and simplifying
we obtain the following F.O.C.:
g2,τ +
α
2
(g1,τ + g2,τ + α)2
(1− ϕ(g1,τ , g2,τ ))(rτ − g1,τ − g2,τ )
−p(g1,τ , g2,τ ;α)ϕg1,τ (g1,τ , g2,τ )(rτ − g1,τ − g2,τ )− p(g1,τ , g2,τ ;α)(1− ϕ(g1,τ , g2,τ )) = 0(14)
Re-arranging, simplifying, and dropping the time subscripts for notational rea-
sons, we obtain:
(
g2 +
α
2
)
(1− ϕ(g1, g2))(r − g1 − g2)− ϕg1(g1, g2)(r − g1 − g2)
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α)
−(1− ϕ(g1, g2))
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α) = 0(15)
In the first subsection of the Appendix, we show that the S.O.C. is satisfied at
optimality, so that the objective function is quasi-concave in g1.
Using the equivalent expression for player 2 implies that at optimality the follow-
ing equality must hold:
g2 +
α
2(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α)
(1−ϕ(g1, g2))−ϕg1(g1, g2) =
g1 +
α
2(
g2 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α)
(1−ϕ(g1, g2))−ϕg2(g1, g2)
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From this last expression we deduce that g∗1 = g
∗
2, for otherwise the equality is
necessarily violated.6 We can therefore implicitly express the optimal amount of
weapons g∗1,τ = g
∗
2,τ = g
∗
τ :
(1− ϕ(g∗τ , g∗τ ))(rτ − 4g∗τ − α)− (2g∗τ + α)ϕg∗τ (rτ − 2g∗τ ) = 0 (16)
Where ϕg∗τ stands for a short notation of ϕg(g
∗(rτ ), g∗(rτ )). The utility of player
i in time period τ thus equals:
V w1,τ =
ln
(
(1−δ)
2
(1− ϕ(g∗τ , g∗τ )) (rτ − 2g∗τ )
)
1− δ +
δ ln ((1 + γ)δ)
(1− δ)2 (17)
The implicit description of g∗τ as given by (16) allows us to deduce the following
result:
Lemma 1. Militarization increases monotonically in the stock of resources. More-
over, for any finite r, if α > α¯(r), conflicts are weaponless.
The intuition of Lemma 1 is straightforward. The first part is a standard result
in the conflict literature: the larger the prize at stake, the more effort the contestants
will invest in attempting to grab the resource. The second part of the lemma tells
us that the smaller the ability of the contestants to influence the partition of the
resource by holding weapons, the smaller will be their investments, with conflict
eventually being weaponless for high values of α. For the remaining of the article we
assume that α > α¯(0) so that for very low levels of resources, conflicts are weaponless
6If, for instance, g1 > g2, both terms of the LHS are individually smaller than their counterpart
of the RHS.
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because the players do not find it optimal to attempt influencing the de facto sharing
of the resources.
Lemma 1 is very useful in showing the following lemma:
Lemma 2. For sufficiently low levels of resources, the efficient extraction rate cannot
be the equilibrium extraction rate.
For the proof, see the third subsection of the Appendix.
This lemma constitutes an important building block of our main result because
it implies that if the punishment inflicted on deviators from the efficient agreement
was the reversion to conflict, then the efficient solution would not be an equilibrium
outcome for low levels of resources. The intuition behind this result lies in the
increasingly small cost of conflict when the resources are sufficiently depleted: as
the value of the prize at stake diminishes the players will extract less resources for
weapon-building if conflict was to occur, hence implying that the damage generated
by conflict will equally be contained. This implies that players eventually prefer to
free-ride on their opponent’s cooperative effort in the short run and then to revert
to a low-intensity conflict. For sufficiently low stocks of resources, therefore, the
short run benefits of reneging on the cooperative behavior coupled with low conflict
intensity, and thus low dynamic inefficiencies from destroyed production, outmatch
the dynamic foregone future consumption from eternal cooperation.
In Section 2 we characterized the set of SPE constituting the harshest subgame
perfect punishments, and equally mentioned the existence of alternative SPE that
could support the cooperative solution as an equilibrium. In light of these strategies,
we need to determine whether in a conflictual world cooperation is still sustainable
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at equilibrium. By the very definition of the efficient solution, it is not Pareto-
dominated, hence implying that compared to any potential alternative SPE at least
one player is strictly better-off under the efficient solution. The very fact that both
players find it optimal to deviate from the cooperative strategy and then to revert to
conflict when r becomes sufficiently small equally implies therefore that no alternative
SPE can exist.
A relevant question is whether the cooperative equilibrium whereby both players
extract the quantities determined by the social planner on the equilibrium path may
still be implemented in the short run. We could, for instance, devise a strategy where
players would credibly threat each other to revert to non-cooperation for a finite
number of periods in case of non-compliance, before eventually declaring conflict.
The following Proposition establishes that this is never the case:
Proposition 2. In a depletable resource exploitation game where players can revert
to violence to appropriate the common pool resource, the equilibrium is such that
players exploit non-cooperatively the resource when the stock of resources is abundant,
whereas they revert to conflict if the resource becomes sufficiently scarce.
For the proof see the fourth subsection of the Appendix.
Proposition 2 highlights the important implications of introducing conflict in a
dynamic game of CPR management. Interestingly, the prospect of conflict makes
off-the-equilibrium-path threats non credible, when these same threats would have
supported the first-best outcome in the absence of conflict. Thus, conflict may be
expected not to occur for a long period of time, but the very expectation of conflict
induces the players not to cooperate. Because the conflict decision is endogenous,
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when opting for conflict the (symmetric) players necessarily fare better than by
exploiting the resources non-cooperatively. This implies that the unique (Pareto-
dominated) non-cooperative equilibrium of this game ceases being an equilibrium
with the introduction of conflict. Yet, although conflict removes from the game its
worst equilibria, it equally eliminates the Pareto-superior ones as the cooperative
equilibrium can no longer be sustained. It is therefore noteworthy to emphasize that
irrespectively of the amount of weapons invested in the - possibly distant - conflict,
the following corollary holds true:
Corollary 1. The anticipation of conflict accelerates resource depletion as compared
to a cooperative path of play, and reduces the players’ equilibrium utility.
Proof. This follows from three facts. Assume conflict takes place in time t. Then,
(i) from that time period on the players behave similarly to the cooperative scenario
given that they privately own part of the resources. Hence for the same amount
of resources rt, conservation would be equivalent under either scenario. Next, (ii)
in period t, under conflict resources are devoted to building weapons, and conflict
destroys part of the stock of resources. These two forces reduce the post-conflict stock
of resources as compared to the cooperative path of play. Lastly, (iii) in any period
preceding conflict, under the conflict scenario the players play non-cooperatively,
hence depleting faster the stock of resources as compared to the cooperative path of
play.
This finding must not be mis-interpreted as conflict reducing the players’ utility
because of either the opportunity cost of conflict, or the direct inefficiencies tied
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to fighting activities. The reduction in the players’ utility is primarily linked to
the inability to sustain the cooperative Pareto-superior equilibrium, because the
punishments supporting this equilibrium are no longer credible.
4 Concluding remarks
We introduced in a standard dynamic game of common pool resource management
the possibility of privatizing the common resource by reverting to conflict. If conflict
is waged in the presence of high stocks of resources, the players invest important
amounts in conflict. The high opportunity cost of this operation coupled with the
potentially destructive nature of heavily armed conflicts induces the players to refrain
from initiating conflict. For low levels of resources, however, conflict becomes a
profitable option. The implications of this finding are profound because the strategies
that are traditionally used to sustain cooperation are no longer subgame perfect. As
a consequence, the cooperative equilibrium breaks down. In the presence of abundant
resources, the players exploit non-cooperatively the CPR in expectation of conflict
occurring after the stock has been sufficiently depleted at some point in the future.
Importantly, compared to the cooperative equilibrium, the unique equilibrium in this
CPR game with conflict involves a faster depletion of the resource, and lower utility
levels for the players. This is true even when the players expend minimal resources
in conflict.
The theory developed in this article assumes away the existence of a third party
able to enforce peaceful Pareto-superior agreements. It is crucial to keep in mind that
19
it is in such contexts that the “tragedy of the commons” emerges. Indeed, Coase’s
theorem teaches us that if property rights are well defined and enforced in the absence
of transaction costs, then the first best solution is implemented. In the presence of
strong institutions efficient solutions are always implementable, and in the absence
of transaction costs there always exist transfers between players leaving everyone
better-off. Interestingly in such settings, whether ownership is private or public
would make no difference in terms of efficiency. The “tragedy of the commons” is at
play in the presence of weak institutions. Yet, it is precisely in such contexts that the
theory developed in this article becomes relevant. Our theory therefore underlines
the importance of improving institutions when attempting to achieve more efficient
economic outcomes.
In this article we have assumed a perfect information setting. Lifting this hypoth-
esis and endowing a third-party with private information over the stock of resources
or its regeneration rate would enable the third party to potentially improve the out-
come’s efficiency by strategically selecting the information to transmit, even in the
presence of weak institutions. This interesting question is a fruitful topic to explore
in future research.
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1 Appendix
This Appendix contains the proofs of the lemmas and propositions. It also demon-
strates the quasi-concavity of the utility function under conflict.
1.1 Quasi-concavity of Uw1,t(g1)
Proof. By implicitly computing ∂2Uw1,t(g1)/∂g1∂g1 using equation (15), we obtain:
∂2Uw1,t(g1)
∂g1∂g1
= −
(
g2 +
α
2
)
ϕg1(r − g1 − g2)− (2g1 + g2 +
3α
2
)ϕg1(r − g1 − g2)
−ϕg1g1(r − g1 − g2)
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α) + 2ϕg1
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α)
−2(g1 + g2 + α)(1− ϕ) (A-1)
The only positive term in this expression is 2ϕg1
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α). Yet, by
equation (15) we deduce that 2ϕg1
(
g1 +
α
2
)
(g1 + g2 + α) < (2g2 + α)(1− ϕ), and it
thus follows that the sign of the above expression is negative.
1.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Applying the implicit functions’ theorem on expression (16) we obtain:
∂g∗
∂r
= − (1− ϕ)− ϕg∗(2g
∗ + α)
−2φg∗(rτ − 4g∗ − α)− 4(1− φ)− 2φg∗(rτ − 2g∗) + 2(2g∗ + α)φg∗ − (2g∗ + α)φg∗g∗(rτ − 2g∗)
(A-2)
From (16) we deduce that (1−ϕ) > ϕg∗(2g∗+α). As a consequence, the numerator
of (A-2) is positive, whereas the denominator is negative, hence making the whole
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expression strictly positive for any value of r. Next, because the first term of (14)
tends to zero when α becomes arbitrarily big, it follows that for any finite r there
exists a value α¯(r) such that, g∗(α¯(r), r) = 0 for any α ≥ α¯(r), and g∗(α¯(r), r) > 0
for any α < α¯(r).
1.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Our aim is to demonstrate that ∃r > 0 such that ∀rt < r
ln(xdev1 (x
c
2(rt))) + δV
w
1,t+1(rt+1) > V
c
1,t(rt) (A-3)
Replacing by the optimal values of the variables we have already derived, this
expression can be re-written as:
ln
(
xdev1
(
1− δ
2
rt
))
+
δ ln
(
(1−δ)
2
(1− ϕ(g∗t+1, g∗t+1))
(
rt+1 − 2g∗t+1
))
1− δ
+
δ2 ln ((1 + γ)δ)
(1− δ)2 >
1
1− δ
[
ln
(
(1− δ)rt
2
)
+
δ
1− δ ln (δ(1 + γ))
]
(A-4)
We proceed is two steps.
Assume first that in some time t, ϕ(.) = 0 and ϕg = 0. Moreover, take r
sufficiently small such that α ≥ α¯(r). If that was the case, we would necessarily have
g∗t = 0. Replacing in (17) would then yield:
V w1,t+1 =
1
1− δ ln
(
(1− δ)rt+1
2
)
+
δ
(1− δ)2 ln((1 + γ)δ)
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Replacing in (A-4) would give us:
ln
(
xdev1
(
1− δ
2
rt
))
+
δ ln
(
(1−δ)
2
rt+1
)
1− δ +
δ2 ln ((1 + γ)δ)
(1− δ)2
>
1
1− δ
[
ln
(
(1− δ)rt
2
)
+
δ
1− δ ln (δ(1 + γ))
]
(A-5)
Optimizing the LHS of this inequality w.r.t. xdev1 (x
c
2) we obtain the next F.O.C.:
1
xdev1
=
δ
1− δ
1
(1 + δ)rt/2− xdev1
(A-6)
Solving for xdev1 gives us:
xdev1 (x
c
2; rt) =
(1− δ)(1 + δ)
2
rt (A-7)
Substituting in (A-4) gives the following expression:
ln
(
(1− δ)(1 + δ)
2
rt
)
+
δ ln
(
(1−δ)
2
(
(1+γ)δ(1+δ)
2
rt
))
1− δ +
δ2 ln ((1 + γ)δ)
(1− δ)2
>
1
1− δ
[
ln
(
(1− δ)rt
2
)
+
δ
1− δ ln (δ(1 + γ))
]
(A-8)
Simplifying yields:
ln(1 + δ) + δ ln(1/2) > 0 (A-9)
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And this last inequality is always true with strict inequality for δ ∈]0, 1[.
Second, we know that g(0) = 0, so that lim
rt→0
ϕ = lim
rt→0
ϕg = 0. Hence, we deduce
that:
lim
rt→0
(
ln(xdev1 (x
c
2(rt))) + δV
w
1,t+1(rt+1)
)
> lim
rt→0
(
V c1,t(rt)
)
We can therefore deduce that there exists a strictly positive r such that both
players prefer deviating from the cooperative path and reverting to conflict ∀rt ≤
r.
1.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. To establish this result we proceed in four steps. We first show (i) that when
rτ → 0, players strictly prefer declaring conflict in the first stage of the time period,
instead of peacefully exploiting the resource in a non-cooperative manner. We then
show (ii) that when rτ →∞, players strictly prefer foregoing immediate conflict and
extracting non-cooperatively the resource, and (iii) that the utilities of the players
being continuous in rt there exists values r¯τ and rτ such that ∀rτ > r¯τ players extract
non-cooperatively the resource, and ∀rτ ≤ rτ players declare conflict. Lastly, (iv) we
show why the cooperative equilibrium is therefore not sustainable.
(i) Having shown that limrτ→0 g(rτ ) = 0, it follows that when resources tend
to be fully depleted, under conflict the efficient solution can be fully replicated.
By the definition of the efficient solution, we therefore have that when rτ → 0,
ln(xnci ) + δU
w
i,τ (rτ+1) > V
w
i,τ (rτ ).
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(ii) We first re-express the implicit definition of g(rτ ) as given by (16) as:
rτ =
(4gτ + α) (1− φ(gτ , gτ ))− 2gτ (2gτ + α)φgτ
(1− φ(gτ , gτ ))− (2gτ + α)φgτ
Taking rτ →∞, for the above equality to hold the RHS of the expression ought to
tend to infinity as well. Assume first that g−i(rt) tends to infinity, so that ϕ(gi, g−i) =
1 ∀gi. Then by inspection of (15), we deduce that gi(gj) = 0. Notice next that ∀g−i
s.t. φ(0, g−i) < 1, ∃ a finite gˆi s.t. φ(gˆi, g−i) = 1 and Ui(gˆi, g−i) = −∞. Given
that ∀gi ∈]0, gˆ[, Ui(gi, g−i) > 0, gi(g−i) < gˆi, and is therefore finite. If gi is finite,
however, the above equality can only be true if the denominator tends to zero, which
is verified when (1 − φ(gi(rτ ), gj(rτ ))) = (gi(rτ ) + gj(rτ ) + α)φgi(rτ ). The condition
having to hold for both i and j, it is necessary that gi = gj.
We then show that limrτ→∞ V
w
i,τ (rτ ) < limrτ→∞ ln(x
nc
i (rτ ))+limrτ→∞ δV
w
i,τ+1(rτ+1).
If in time period τ , players do not declare conflict, and instead exploit the resource
non-cooperatively, the maximization problem for player i is given by:
max
xi
ln(xi) + δV
w
i,τ+1(rτ+1)
subject to rτ+1 = (1 + γ)(1− xi,τ − xj,τ )rτ . Optimizing for both players allows us to
obtain: xnci (rτ ) = x
nc
j (rτ ) =
1−δ
2−δrτ , and rτ+1 =
(1+γ)δ
2−δ rτ .
Using expression (17) and the values derived above, we can therefore write V wi,τ (rτ )−
25
ln(xi)− δV wi,τ (rτ+1) < 0 as:
1
1− δ ln
(
1− δ
2
(1− ϕ(gτ , gτ ))(rτ − 2gτ )
)
+ δ ln
(
(1 + γ)δ
(1− δ)2
)
− ln
(
(1− δ)
2− δ rτ
)
− δ
1− δ ln
(
1− δ
2
(1− ϕ(gτ+1, gτ+1))
(
(1 + γ)δ
2− δ rτ − 2gτ+1
))
− δ
2
(1− δ)2 ln((1 + γ)δ) < 0
We next collect terms ans simplify the above expression, take the limit of the
condition as rτ →∞, use the fact that then gτ = gτ+1, and we then obtain:
ln
(
1− φ(gτ , gτ )
2
)
+
δ
1− δ ln ((1 + γ)δ) + ln(2− δ) < limrτ→∞ ln
rτ
[
(1+γ)δrτ
2−δ − 2gτ
]
rτ − 2gτ

Applying l’Hoˆspital’s rule to the bracketed term of the RHS of this expression, we
deduce that the bracketed term tends to infinity given that:
lim
rτ→∞
2(1+γ)δrτ
2−δ − 2gτ
1
=∞
As a consequence, when rτ → ∞, ln(xnci ) + δV wi,τ (rτ+1) > V wi,τ (rτ ), and players
exploit the resource non-cooperatively in time τ .
(iii) The players’ utility being continuous in the level of resources, by the inter-
mediate values theorem the threshold values r¯ and r must exist.
(iv) Points (i) to (iii) enable us to conclude that there exists a r such that
conflict occurs. For any r ≤ r cooperation cannot be sustained by a punishment
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threat given that otherwise in the punishment period’s first stage the punished player
would declare conflict. Can cooperation then be sustained for rτ > r? The worst
punishment that can be imposed gives to the punished player the same utility as the
conflict strategy for the same reason as above. Assume that in τ , rτ = r+. If player
2 deviates in τ − 1, denote by xˆ2 the punishment action of player 2 in τ , and by xˆ1
the action of player 1. If player 1 is better-off by extracting xˆ1 than x
dev(xˆ2), it is
necessarily the case that player 2 is better off by playing non-cooperatively instead of
accepting the punishment, that is: ln(xdev(xˆ1))+δV
w
τ+1((1+γ)(rτ − xˆ1−xdev(xˆ1))) >
ln(xˆ2) + δV
w
τ+1((1 + γ)(rτ − xˆ1 − xˆ2)). If player 1 is worse-off by extracting xˆ1 than
xdev(xˆ2), player 1 has incentives to deviate from the punishment scheme. In time
period τ , the punishment is therefore not credible, and in τ − 1, cooperation is not
sustainable. Applying the argument backwardly completes the proof.
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